- The Unsettling View from Moscow
- Site-wide navigation
- U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force
- Turkey’s Relations with NATO & Russia: A Foreign Policy Impasse? - TPQ
- The dangerous decade: Russia-NATO relations 2014 to 2024
Similarly, the U. There have been three main areas of concern in U. The end of the cold war produced the hope that the U.
The Unsettling View from Moscow
These hopes have only been partially fulfilled. Deteriorating U.
Virtually all U. There has also been a call from the Republican majority in the U. Congress to develop and deploy a national missile defense NMD system. But such a policy may cause Russia to stop reducing its nuclear arsenal and begin developing its own ballistic missile defenses. This scenario would inevitably lead to a U. This decision was ratified by the U.
Senate in April It sends the message that Russia is still considered a potential threat rather than a partner in the European security arena. An American-Russian rivalry is emerging in the Caspian Sea region, which may have a dampening affect on further security relations. It is estimated that anywhere from 25 to trillion barrels of oil and comparable reserves of natural gas lie below the Caspian seabed. The five nations that border the Caspian Sea Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan in addition to major Western oil corporations are eager to explore and further develop Caspian oil and gas reserves.
Caspian oil development also means investment opportunities for American oil and construction companies.
U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force
Politically, the U. Russia is concerned that the U. It is also worried that investment in the Caspian Sea oilfields will divert Western financial backing and interests from Russian oil production in Siberia and the Far East. Several steps can be taken to begin this process: put greater emphasis on the security of Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials, jump-start negotiations on arms control and disarmament, and slow down if not stop further expansion of NATO. The danger of nuclear theft in Russia represents a serious threat to U. But these efforts are progressing slower than required by the scale of the problem.
These cooperative programs require greater political and financial support if they are to achieve their goals. Although U. In the realm of arms control, the U. The current U.
This U. Any efforts to deploy an ABM system by the U. Additionally, the policy regarding NATO expansion has been and will continue to be a source of friction between Russia and the United States. Russia perceives that NATO expansion is directed solely against it and threatens its future security. To avoid worsening relations, the U.
Inviting any of these countries to join NATO could spark a serious crisis in the future. The Kremlin does not yet appear to have shifted to a pre-emptive posture, based on open-source reporting. And there is a significant likelihood that Moscow may ultimately endorse pre-emption for the defense of the Russian state in the coming decades. The Kremlin has indicated as well its belief that the United States would be willing to use force to impose its will on Russia in the future, if Russia is not prepared to defend itself. They assess that a host of new military technologies are collapsing the battlespace and giving growing advantage to the side that escalates first.
- Who Lost Turkey?;
- Research from the Defence Studies Department, King's College London.
- U.S. and Russian Nuclear Concepts, Past and Present | American Academy of Arts and Sciences?
- U.S. Russia Security Relations - Institute for Policy Studies.
- Current Practice Guidelines in Primary Care 2008 (Lange Medical Book)!
- U.S. and Russian Nuclear Concepts, Past and Present | American Academy of Arts and Sciences!
- Foreign relations of Russia - Wikipedia;
These systems will allow both Russia and the United States to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. From a Russian perspective, seizing the initiative will be the key to deterrence or if necessary military defeat of Western aggression in this collapsing battlespace. Pre-emption advocates contend that if Moscow does not escalate first in a future crisis or conflict, then the United States and its allies will. If that happens, they fear that Russian defenses will be unable to repel or absorb the U.
They expect further that the Russian Federation will be unable to seize back the initiative once it is lost. Indeed, if the initial period of this future war is as devastating as many expect, the Russian armed forces may have limited retaliatory options left. It would deny Russian, U. The result would be to increase the risk of rapid early military strikes and rampant escalation.jenkins.devops.indosystem.com/1965-what-is.php
Turkey’s Relations with NATO & Russia: A Foreign Policy Impasse? - TPQ
This will be especially dangerous in the coming years. In view of the growing perceived fragility of Russian and U. The United States should therefore take steps to dissuade Moscow from shifting to a doctrine of pre-emption. It is beyond the scope of this study to offer exhaustive recommendations to this effect.
As a starting point, U. This policy approach is not without risks.
Yet, the evolving security environment demands a more active U. If the Russian Federation officially adopts a defensive doctrine of pre-emption, it will signify the opening of a deeply concerning chapter in U. That chapter would be defined by more acute fear, hastening timelines, and perilous risk-taking in a security environment defined by uncertainty.
The dangerous decade: Russia-NATO relations 2014 to 2024
It would constitute a return to Cold War—level tensions, only this time with more ways for the United States and Russia to stumble into potentially catastrophic escalation than before. Russian policymakers believe their nation is under siege. The eastward march of liberalism in post—Cold War Europe is seen by the Kremlin to pose an existential threat to the Russian state. Meanwhile, rapid shifts in the military-technological environment are simultaneously exposing Russia to U.
They cite a host of U. For instance, Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, often characterize NATO expansion in the s and s as an effort to isolate and subordinate Russia. Russian analysts say the United States ultimately hopes to use these proxies to stir dissent within Russia itself. These attempts to co-opt or reorient regional actors to disadvantage Russia are not isolated events, according to Russian analysts.
Instead, they sit within a long history of U. Lastly, Russian policymakers find little reason to expect that future U. Frequent citations to this effect include U. In this context, some Russian officials believe that President Donald J. This means that any gains achieved through U. As a result, Russian policymakers assess that the United States and its allies will remain a serious and lasting threat to Russian national security for the foreseeable future.
Rising U. Russian strategists forecast that a host of novel or improved military technologies will allow both parties to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. At the same time, new weapon systems integrating greater autonomy and harnessing new physical principles promise to inject even further uncertainty into the U. Russian analysts in Military Thought and other outlets consistently forecast that major wars in the future will be fought across all domains — not just in the land, sea, and air.